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Abstract: Biometric presentation attack detection is gaining increasing attention. Users of mobile devices find it more convenient
to unlock their smart applications with finger, face or iris recognition instead of passwords. In this paper, we survey the approaches
presented in the recent literature to detect face and iris presentation attacks. Specifically, we investigate the effectiveness of
fine tuning very deep convolutional neural networks to the task of face and iris antispoofing. We compare two different fine
tuning approaches on six publicly available benchmark datasets. Results show the effectiveness of these deep models in learning
discriminative features that can tell apart real from fake biometric images with very low error rate. Cross-dataset evaluation on face
PAD showed better generalization than state of the art. We also performed cross-dataset testing on iris PAD datasets in terms of
equal error rate which was not reported in literature before. Additionally, we propose the use of a single deep network trained to
detect both face and iris attacks. We have not noticed accuracy degradation compared to networks trained for only one biometric
separately. Finally, we analyzed the learned features by the network, in correlation with the image frequency components, to justify
its prediction decision.
1 Introduction
Biometric recognition has been increasingly used in recent appli-
cation that need authentication and verification. Instead of normal
username and password or token-based authentication, the use of
biometric traits like face, iris or fingerprints are more convenient to
the users and so has gained a lot of popularity specially after the
wide spread of smartphones and its usage in a lot of areas, such as
payment. However, with the increase of technology, spoofing these
biometric traits has become more easy. For example, an attacker can
use a photograph or a video replay of the face or iris or a person
to gain access to his/her smartphone or any application that needs
authorization. Such act is referred to by the ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016
standard as presentation attack (PA) and the biometric or object used
in PA is called an artifact or presentation attack instrument (PAI).
This has lead to the increase of interest in designing algorithms that
guard against these attacks, and so are called presentation attack
detection (PAD) algorithms.
Lots of research has been done in this area, starting with methods
that basically depend on designing and extracting hand-crafted fea-
tures from the acquired images then using conventional classifiers
to detect bona-fide (real) from attack presentations. Literature shows
that methods relying on manually engineered features are suitable
for solving the PAD problem for face and iris recognition systems.
However, the design and selection of handcrafted feature extractors
is mainly based on expert knowledge of researchers on the problem.
Consequently, these features often reflect limited aspects of the prob-
lem and are often sensitive to varying acquisition conditions, such
as camera devices, lighting conditions and PAIs. This causes their
detection accuracy to vary significantly among different databases,
indicating that the handcrafted features have poor generalizability
and so do not completely solve the PAD problem.
In recent years, deep learning has evolved and the use of deep
neural networks or convolutional neural networks (CNN) has proven
to be effective in many computer vision tasks especially with the
availability of new advanced hardware and large data. CNNs have
been successfully used for vision problems like image classifica-
tion and object detection. This has encouraged many researchers to
incorporate deep learning in the PAD problem, and rely on a deep
network or CNN to learn features that discriminate between bona-
fide and attack face [1, 2] or iris [3, 4] or both [5], instead of using
hand-crafted features. Several of these researches used CNN only for
feature extraction followed by a classic classifier like SVM, others
designed custom networks or combined information from CNN and
hand-crafted features.
Several surveys for presentation attack detections in either face or
iris recognition are available in literature. Czajka and Bowyer pro-
vided a thorough assessment of the state-of-the-art for iris PAD in [6]
and concluded that PAD for iris recognition is not a solved problem
yet. Their main focus was on iris presentation attack categories, their
countermeasures, competitions and applications.
For PAD in face recognition systems, Raghavendra and Bush pro-
vided a comprehensive survey in [7] describing different types of
presentation attack and face artifacts, and showing the vulnerability
of commercial face recognition systems to presentation attack. They
survey and evaluate fourteen state-of-the-art face PAD algorithms on
CASIA face-spoofing database and discuss the remaining challenges
and open issues for a robust face presentation attack detection sys-
tem. In [8], Ghaffar and Mohd focused their review on face PAD
systems on smartphones with recent face datasets captured with
mobile devices.
Later, Li et al. [9] provided a comprehensive review of more
recent PAD algorithms in face recognition, discussing the avail-
able datasets and reported results. They proposed a color-LBP based
countermeasure as a case study and evaluated it on two benchmark
face datasets highlighting the importance of cross-dataset testing.
In this work, we survey most of the recent PAD approaches pro-
posed in literature for both face and iris recognition applications,
along with the competitions and benchmark datasets. Then for a
case study, we assess the performance of recent well-known deep
CNN architectures on the task of face and iris presentation attack
detection.
For assessment we use 3 different face datasets and 3 iris datasets.
Using just the RGB images as input, we finetune the deep network’s
weights then perform intra and cross-dataset evaluation to discuss
the generalization ability of these deep models. The experiments
are first done with separate models trained for each of face and iris
biometric, then we experiment with training a single network to gen-
erally tell apart bona-fide from attack samples whether the sample
is a face or an iris image. Such generic PAD network could per-
fectly differentiate between the real and attack images. The specific
features learned by this network are analyzed showing that these
features are highly related to high frequency regions in the input
images. We finally use gradient-weighted class activation maps [10]
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to visualize what the network focuses on when deciding if a sample
is bona-fide or not.
Hence, the main contributions of this work include: (1) Survey
the recent methods for presentation attack detection in both face and
iris modalities with competitions and datasets, (2) Demonstrate the
effectiveness of CNN for the PAD problem, by finetuning and com-
paring recent deep CNN architectures on 3 benchmark face datasets
and 3 benchmark iris datasets, experimenting with two finetuning
approaches and applying cross-dataset evaluation, (3) Train a sin-
gle network for presentation attack detection of the two biometric
modalities, and compare the results with networks trained on single
biometric, (4) Analyze specific features learned by the commonly-
trained network and (5) Finally, visualize the class activation maps
of the trained network on sample bona-fide and attack images.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow, we first review
the PAD approaches which can broadly be categorized into active
(Section 2) vs passive (Section 3) PAD techniques. Then in
Section 4, we summarize the face and iris PAD competitions and
benchmark databases, followed by Section 5 where we explain
the proposed PAD approach. Experiments, results and analysis are
presented in Section 6 and finally conclusion and future work in
Section 7.
2 Active PAD
Active Presentation Attack Detection can either be hardware-based
or depending on challenge-response, both will be highlighted in
details in this section.
2.1 Hardware-based
Such methods depend on capturing the automatic response of the
biometric trait (face/iris) to a certain stimulus. For example in iris
liveness detection, the use of eye hippus, which is the permanent
oscillation that the eye pupil presents even under uniform lighting
conditions, or the dilation of pupil in reaction to sudden illumination
changes [11–15]. Variations of pupil dilation were calculated by
Bodade et al. [16] from multiple iris images while Huang et al. [17]
used pupil constriction to detect iris liveness. Other researchers used
the iris image brightness variations after light stimuli in some prede-
fined iris regions [18]. Or the reflections of infrared light on the moist
cornea when stimulated with light sources positioned randomly in
space. Lee et al. [19] used additional infrared sensors during iris
image acquisition to construct the full 3d shape of the iris to aid in
the detection of fake iris images or contact lenses. These approaches
rely on an external specific device to be added to the sensor/camera,
hence the naming "hardware-based techniques". However, not all
hardware-based methods are active, some such approaches detect
facial thermogram [20, 21], blood pressure, fingerprint sweat, gait
etc passively in a non-intrusive manner.
2.2 Challenge-response
In these methods, the user is required to respond to a "challenge"
instructed by the system. The system requests the user to perform
some specific movement like "blink right eye" or "rotate the head
clockwise" [22–24] or gaze towards a predefined stimulus [25].
2.3 Drawbacks of active PAD methods
Although active spoof detection methods may provide higher pre-
sentation attack detection rates and robustness against different
presentation attack types, they are more expensive and less con-
venient to users than the software-based approaches which do not
include any additional devices beside the standard camera. For the
rest of this survey we will focus on software-based methods; they
are more generic, less expensive, less intrusive and can easily be
incorporated in real-world applications and smartphones. Table 1
summarizes the different approaches used in literature for detection
of presentation attacks.
3 Passive Software-based PAD
Passive software-based antispoofing methods can be categorized
into several groups. Temporal, or motion-analysis, based approaches
which utilize features extracted from consecutive frames captured
for the face or iris. Or texture-based methods that use single image
of the biometric trait and does not depend on motion features. Such
texture-based PAD methods can further be classified into either a
group that depends on hand-crafted features vs. another group of
recent methods that opt to learn these discriminative features.
3.1 Liveness-detection
The earliest category include approaches that identify whether the
presented biometric is live or an artifact, such approaches are known
as "liveness-detection". An artifact can be a mask or paper in case
of face spoofing and paper or a glass-eye for iris. These methods
depend on detecting signs of life in captured biometric data. Exam-
ples in the case of face PAD are eye blinking [24, 26–29], facial
expression changes, head and/or mouth movements [30–32]. For
the iris PAD, Komogortsev et al. [33] extracted liveness cues from
eye movement in a simulated scenario of an attack by a mechani-
cal replica of the human eye. The authors further investigated in this
line and published more iris liveness detection methods, based on
eye movements and gaze estimation, in later years [34–36].
Liveness-detection methods are considered temporal-based and
can be easily fooled by a replay video of the face or iris or by adding
liveness properties to a still face image by cutting the eye/mouth
parts.
3.2 Recapturing-detection / contextual information
Another approach that belongs to the temporal-based category are
methods that simply detect if the biometric data is a replay of a
recorded sample, referred to as recapturing-detection. These meth-
ods analyze the scene and environment to detect abnormal move-
ments in the video due to a hand holding the presenting 2D mobile
device or paper [37, 38]. Such movements are different than move-
ment of a real face with a static background. Sometimes these
techniques are referred to as motion-analysis depending on motion
cues from planar objects. Some use optical flow to capture and track
the relative movements between different facial parts to determine
spoofing [39, 40], while other researches use motion magnifica-
tion [27, 41], Haralick features [99] or visual rhythm analysis [42].
Other types depend on contextual analysis of the scene [22, 30, 43,
44] or 3d reconstruction [45].
The recapture detection methods fail if the attack is done using an
artifact like a mask, because no replay is present to detect. So a better
and more generic approach is using texture-based methods which
utilize features that can tell the difference between real live biometric
data and a replay or an artifact being presented to the sensor.
3.3 Texture-based (Hand-crafted features)
The category of texture-based methods assumes that the texture,
color and reflectance characteristics captured by genuine face images
are different from those resulting from presentation attacks. For
example, blur and other effects caused by printers and display
devices lead to detectable color artifacts and texture patterns, which
can then be explored to detect presentation attacks.
Researchers use handcrafted image feature extraction methods to
extract image features from face or iris images. They then use a clas-
sification method such as support vector machines (SVM) to classify
images into two classes of bona-fide or presentation attack based on
the extracted image features. Such techniques are faster than tem-
poral or motion-based analysis, as they can operate with only one
image sample, or a selection of images, instead of having to analyze
a complete video sequence.
3.3.1 Texture-reflectance: These techniques analyze appear-
ance properties of face or iris, such as the face reflectance or texture.
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Table 1 PAD methods in literature.
PAD Method Advantage Weakness
Active (Hardware-based or Challenge-response)
- Eye hippus or Pupil-dilation: [11–19]
- Challenge: "blink eye" or "rotate head": [22–25]
Robust against different PA types
Higher PA detection rates
More expensive
Less convenient to users
Rely on an external device
Passive (Software-based):
Liveness-
detection
- Eye blinking: [24, 26–29]
- Facial expression changes, head and/or mouth
movements: [30–32]
- Eye movements and gaze estimationf for
iris: [33–36]
Utilize features extracted from consecutive
frames.
Detect signs of life in captured biometric data.
Can be easily fooled by a replay video or by
adding liveness properties to a still face
image by cutting the eye/mouth parts
Recapturing-
detection
- Detect abnormal movements in the video due
to a hand holding the presenting media [37, 38]
- Track the relative movements between different
facial parts [39, 40]
- Motion magnification [27, 41]
- Visual rhythm analysis [42].
- Contextual analysis of [22, 30, 43, 44]
- 3d reconstruction [45]
Very effective for replay attacks Fail if the attack is done using an artifact like a
mask
Texture-based
(Hand-crafted
features)
- Texture-reflectance [46–48]
- Frequency [38, 49–52]
- Image Quality analysis [12, 12, 18, 53–60]
- Color analysis [49, 57, 61–66].
- Local-descriptors [38, 43, 63, 67–69, 69–74,
74, 75, 75–78, 78–83]
- Fusion [3, 4, 68, 71, 78, 83–85]
Detect effects caused by printers and display
devicesFaster than temporal or motion-based
analysis
Operate with only one image sample, or
a selection of images, instead of video
sequence.
Design and selection of feature extractors is
based on expert knowledge.
Sensitive to varying acquisition conditions,
such as camera devices, lighting conditions
and PAIs.
Have poor generalizability.
Learned-features - Extract deep features, classify classic [29, 86,
87]
- Combine with temporal information [79, 85]
- Other [1, 2, 88, 89, 89–93]
- For iris [3, 4, 94–97]
- Face and iris [5, 98]
Instead of hand engineering features
Deep network learns features that discriminate
between bona-fide and attack samples
Can be used jointly with hand-crafted features
or motion-analysis
Requires more data
Can fail to generalize to unseen sensors
The reflectance and texture of a real face or iris are different than
those acquired from a spoofing material; either printed paper, screen
of a mobile device, mask [46–48] or glass eye.
3.3.2 Image Quality analysis: Techniques that depend on
analysis of image quality try to detect the presence of image
distortion usually found in the spoofed face or iris image.
(1) Deformation for Face: For example, in print attacks, the face
might be skewed with deformed shape if an imposter bends it while
holding.
(2) Frequency: Based on the assumption that the reproduction of
previously captured images or videos affects the frequency informa-
tion of the image when displayed in front of the sensor. The attack
images or videos have more blur and less sharpness than the genuine
ones, and so their high frequency components are affected. Hence
frequency domain analysis can be used as a face PAD method as
in [38, 49, 50] or frequency entropy analysis by Lee et al. [51]. For
iris, Czajka [52] analyzed printing regularities left in printed irises
and explored some peaks in the frequency spectrum. Frequency-
based approaches might fail in case of high-quality spoof images
or videos being presented to the camera.
(3) Quality metrics: Some other methods explore the potential of
quality assessment to identify real and fake face or iris samples
acquired from a high quality printed image. This is assuming that
many image quality metrics are distorted by the display device or
paper. Some researches used individual quality-based features, while
others used a combination of quality metrics to better detect spoofing
and differentiate between bona-fide and attack iris [12, 18, 53–55] or
face [56–58] or both [59, 60]. For example, Gabally et al. [12] inves-
tigated 22 iris-specific quality features and used feature selection to
choose the best combination of features that discriminate between
live and fake iris images. Later, in a follow-up work [100], they
assessed 25 general image-quality metrics and not only applied on
iris PAD but also used the method for face and fingerprint PAD.
Other different approach by Garicia et al. [101] was to analyze
moire patterns which may be produced during image acquisition
then display on mobile devices.
(4) Color analysis: Another type of algorithms utilize the fact that
the distribution of color in images taken from bona-fide face or iris,
is different than the distribution found in images taken from printed
papers or display device. Methods for face PAD adopt solutions in
a different input domain than RGB space in order to improve the
robustness to illumination variation, like HSV and YCbCr color
space [57, 61–64] or Fourier spectrum [49]. For iris PAD, color
adaptive quantized patterns were used in [65] instead of using a gray-
textured image. Z. Boulkenafeta et al. studied the generalization of
color-texture analysis methods in [66].
3.3.3 Local-descriptors: A different group of methods use
hand-crafted features which extract local-texture for PAD [67, 68].
A large variety of local image descriptors have been compared
with respect to their ability to identify spoofed iris, fingerprint, and
face data [69] and some highly successful texture descriptors have
been extensively used for this purpose. For example, in face PAD
methods, descriptors such as local binary pattern (LBP) [70–76],
SIFT [77], SURF [63], HoG [43, 74, 75, 78, 79], DoG [38, 80]
and GLCM [78] have been studied showing good results in discrim-
inating real from attack face images. For PAD in iris recognition,
boosted LBP was first used by He et al. [102], weighted LBP by
Zhang et al. [103] for contact lens detection and later, binarized
statistical image features (BSIF) [81, 82]. Local phase quantization
(LPQ) was investigated for biometric PAD in general, including both
face and iris, by Gragnaniello et al. [69], and census transform (CT)
was used for mobile PAD in [83]. Such local texture descriptors
were then used with a traditional classifier like SVM, LDA, neural
networks and Random Forest.
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3.3.4 Drawback of hand-crafted texture-based methods:
Results of above methods show that the manually engineered fea-
tures are suitable for solving the PAD problem for face and iris
recognition systems. However, their drawback is that the design and
selection of handcrafted feature extractors is mainly based on expert
knowledge of researchers on the problem. Consequently, these fea-
tures often only reflect limited aspects of the problem and are often
sensitive to varying acquisition conditions, such as camera devices,
lighting conditions and presentation attack instruments (PAIs). This
causes their detection accuracy to vary significantly among different
databases, indicating that the handcrafted features have poor gener-
alizability and so do not completely solve the PAD problem. The
available cross-database tests in the literature suggest that the per-
formance of hand-engineered texture-based techniques can degrade
dramatically when operating in unknown conditions. Leading to the
need of automatically extracting vision meaningful features directly
from the data using deep representations to assist in the task of
presentation attack detection.
3.4 Fusion
The presentation attack detection accuracy can be enhanced by using
feature-level or score-level fusion methods to obtain a more gen-
eral countermeasure effective against a various types of presentation
attack. For face PAD, Tronci et al. [84] propose a linear fusion at a
frame and video level combination between static and video analy-
sis. In [78], Schwartz et al. introduce feature level fusion by using
Partial Least Squares (PLS) regression based on a set of low-level
feature descriptors. Some other works [68, 71] obtain an effective
fusion scheme by measuring the level of independence of two anti-
counterfeiting systems. While Feng et al. in [85] integrated both
quality measures and motion cues then used neural networks for
classification.
In the case of iris anti-spoofing, Z. Akhtar et al. [83] proposed to
use decision-level fusion on several local descriptors in addition to
global features. More recently Nguyen et al. [3, 4] explored both
feature-level and score-level fusion of hand-crafted features with
CNN extracted features, and obtained least error using the proposed
score-level fusion methodology.
3.5 Smartphones
In the last few years, research based on smartphone and mobile
device PAD is gaining popularity. Many different algorithms have
been developed and datasets were released to test their performance.
These databases became publicly available and we will list in this
section some of these datasets together with the algorithm proposed
by the authors.
One of the first databases that was dedicated for face PAD on
smartphones is MSU-MFSD [57], the authors Wen et al. used a
PAD method depending on image distortion analysis. Later, the same
group released MSU-USSA [77] and used a combination of texture
analysis (LBP and color) and image analysis techniques. In 2016, the
IDIAP Research Institute released the Replay-Mobile [104] database
and again a combinations of the Image Quality Analysis and Texture
Analysis (Gabor-jets) were used as the proposed PAD.
In the field of Iris spoofing, MobBioFake dataset [54, 105] was
presented in 2014 that was the first to use visible spectrum instead
of near-infrared for iris spoofing where the acquisition sensor is
a mobile device. Sequeira et al. [54] used texture-based iris PAD
algorithm, they combined several image quality features at the fea-
ture level and used SVM for classification. Gragnaniello et al. [106]
proposed a solution based on local-descriptors but with very low
complexity and required low CPU power suitable for mobile appli-
cations. They evaluated on MobBioFake and MICHE [107] datasets
and achieved good performance.
3.6 Learned-features
In recent years, deep learning has evolved and the use of deep neu-
ral networks or convolutional neural networks (CNN) has proved to
be effective in many computer vision tasks especially with the avail-
ability of new advanced hardware and large data. CNNs have been
successfully used for vision problems like image classification and
object detection. This has encouraged many researchers to incorpo-
rate deep learning in the PAD problem. Instead of using hand-crafted
features, rely on a deep network or CNN to learn features that
discriminate between bona-fide and attack face [1, 2, 29, 85, 86, 91–
93] or iris [3, 4, 94, 95] or both [5, 98]. Some proposed to use
hybrid features that combine information from both handcrafted and
deeply-learnt features.
Several works use a pretrained CNN as a feature extractor, then
use a normal classifier as SVM for classification, like in [86].
Li et al. [86] finetune a pretrained VGG CNN model on Ima-
geNet [108], use it to extract features, reduce dimensionality by
principal component analysis (PCA) then classify with SVM. Com-
bining deep features with motion cues was proposed in several face
video spoof detection. In [29], Patel et al. finetuned a pretrained
VGG for texture features extraction in addition to using frame differ-
ence as motion cue. Similarly, Nguyen et al. [87] used VGG for deep
feature extraction then fused it with multi-level LBP features, and
used SVM for final classification. Feng et al. [85] combine image
quality information together with motion information from optical
flow as input to a neural network for classification of bona-fide or
attack face. Xu et al.propose an LSTM-CNN architecture to utilize
temporal information for binary classification in [79].
Atoum et al. [88] propose a two-steam CNN-based face PAD
method using texture and depth, they utilized both full face and
patches from the face with different color spaces instead of RGB.
They evaluated on three benchmark databases but did not perform
cross-dataset evaluation. Later, Liu et al. [89] extended and refined
this work by learning another auxiliary information, rPPG signal,
from the face video and evaluated their depth-supervised learn-
ing approach on more recent datasets OULU-NPU [109] and SiW.
Wang et al. [90] did not consider depth as an auxiliary supervision
like in [89], however, they used multiple RGB frames to estimate
face depth information, and used two modules to extract short and
long-term motion. Four benchmark datasets were used to evaluate
their approach.
Use of CNN by itself for the sake of classifying attack vs
bona-fide iris images has been investigated in recent years. Andrey
K. et al. [96] proposed to use a lightweight CNN on binarized sta-
tistical image features extracted from the iris image, they evaluated
their proposed algorithm on LivDet-Warsaw 2017 [110] and other
3 benchmark datasets. In [97] Hoffman et al. proposed to use 25
patches of the iris image as input to the CNN instead of the full
iris image. Then a patch-level fusion method is used to fuse scores
from the input patches based on the percentage of iris and pupil
pixels inside each patch. They performed cross-dataset evaluation
on LivDet-Iris 2015 Warsaw, CASIA-Iris-Fake, and the BERC-Iris-
Fake datasets and used true detection rate (TDR) at 0.2% false
detection rate (FDR) as their evaluation metric.
4 Competitions and Databases
In this section, we summarize the face and iris PAD competitions
held in addition to benchmark datasets used to evaluate perfor-
mance of the face or iris presentation attack detection solutions. All
these databases are publicly available upon request from the authors.
Table 2 shows summary of information about all six datasets used.
4.1 Competitions
Since 2011, several competitions were held to assess the status of
presentation attack detection for either face or iris. Such competi-
tions were very useful for collecting new benchmark datasets and
creating a common framework for evaluating the different PAD
methods.
For face presentation attack detection, three competitions were
carried out since 2011. The first competition was held during
2011 [111] on the IDIAP Print-Attack dataset [67] with six com-
peting teams, the winning methodology was using hand-engineered
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Table 2 Properties of used face and iris databases.
Database Number of samples Resolution FPS / Video(Attack + Bona-fide) ( W * H ) duration (face videos)
Replay-Attack (Face) 1000 + 200 (videos) 320× 240 25 / 9-15 seconds
MSU-MFSD (Face) 210 + 70 (videos) 720× 480 30 / 9-15 seconds
Replay-Mobile (Face) 640 + 390 (videos) 720× 1280 30 / 10-15 seconds
Warsaw 2013 (Iris) 815 + 825 (images) 640× 480 -
ATVS-FIr (Iris) 800 + 800 (images) 640× 480 -
MobBioFake (Iris) 800 + 800 (images) 250× 200 -
texture-based approaches which proved to be very effective to detect
print attacks. After two years, the second face PAD competition
was carried out in 2013 [112] with 8 participating teams, on the
Replay-Attack dataset [73]. Most of the teams relied only on texture-
based methods, while 3 teams used hybrid approaches combining
both texture and motion based countermeasures. Two of these hybrid
approaches reached 0% HTER on the test set of the Replay-Attack
database.
Later in 2017, a competition was held on generalized software-
based face presentation attack detection in mobile scenarios [64].
Thirteen teams participated and four protocols were used for evalu-
ation. The winning team that showed best generalization to unseen
cameras and attack types, used a combination of color, texture and
motion-based features.
More recently, after the release of the large-scale multi-modal
face anti-spoofing dataset, CASIA-SURF [113]; the Chalearn LAP
Multi-Modal Face anti-spoofing Attack Detection Challenge [114]
was held in 2019. Thirteen teams were qualified for the final round
with all submitted face PAD solutions relying on CNN-based feature
extractors. The top 3 teams utilized ensembles of feature extractors
and classifiers. For future work, the challenge paper suggested to
take full advantage of the multi-modal dataset, by defining a set
of cross-modal testing protocols, as well as introducing 3D mask
attacks in addition to the 2D attacks. These recommendations were
later fulfilled in the following year, at the Chalearn Multi-modal
Cross-ethnicity Face anti-spoofing Recognition Challenge, using the
CASIA-SURF CeFA [115] dataset.
For iris presentation attack detection, the first competition was
LivDet-Iris 2013 [116] then two more sequels for this competition
were held in 2015 [117] and 2017 [110]. Images in LivDet-Iris
included iris printouts and textured contact lenses which were more
difficult to detect than printouts. For LivDet-Iris 2017, the test
images were split into known and unknown parts, where the known
part contained images that were taken under similar conditions with
the same sensor as training images. On the other hand, the unknown
partition consisted of images taken in different environment with dif-
ferent properties. Results on known partition were much better than
those on the unknown part. In 2014, another competition was held
in 2014 specifically for mobile authentication; Mobile Iris Liveness
Detection Competition (MobILive 2014) [118]. A mobile device was
used to capture images of iris printouts in visible light; MobBioFake
dataset, not infra-red light as datasets used in LivDet-Iris competi-
tions. Six teams participated and the winning team achieved perfect
detection of presentation attack. For a more thorough assessment of
these iris competitions, refer to Czajka and Bowyer [6].
4.2 Face spoofing Databases
In Table 3 we add details on the presentation media and presentation
attack instruments (PAI) of the used face video datasets.
4.2.1 Replay-Attack: One of the earliest datasets presented in
literature in 2012 for the problem of face spoofing is the Replay-
Attack dataset [73], as a sequel to its Print-Attack version introduced
in 2011 [67]. The database contains a total of 1200 short videos
between 9 and 15 seconds. The videos are taken at resolution 320×
240 from 50 different subjects. Each subject has 4 bona-fide videos
and 20 spoofed ones, so the full dataset has 200 bona-fide videos and
1000 spoofed videos. The dataset is divided into 3 subject-disjoint
subsets one for training, one for development and one for testing.
The training as well as the development subset each has 15 subjects,
while the test subset has videos from the remaining 20 subjects.
Results on this dataset is reported as the HTER (Half Total Error
Rate) on the test subset when the detector threshold is set on the
EER (Equal Error Rate) of the development set. For both the real
and spoof videos, each subject was recorded twice with a regular
webcam in two different lighting settings; controlled and adverse.
As for the spoofed videos, first high-resolution videos were taken
of the subject with a Canon PowerShot SX150 IS camera, then
three techniques were used to generate 5 spoofing scenarios: (1)
"hard-copy print-attack", where high-resolution digital photographs
are presented to the camera. The photographs are printed with a
Triumph-Adler DCC 2520 color laser printer on A4 paper. (2)
"mobile-attack" using a photo once and replay of the recorded video
on an iPhone 3GS screen (with resolution 480× 320 pixels) once,
(3) "high-definition" attack by displaying a photo or replaying the
video on "high-resolution screen" using an iPad (first generation,
with a screen resolution of 1024× 768 pixels). Each of the 5 scenar-
ios was recorder in two different lighting conditions as stated above,
then presented to the sensor in 2 different ways. Either with a "fixed"
tripod, or by an attacker holding the presenting device (printed paper
or replay device) with his/her "hand", leading to a total of 20 attack
videos per subject. More details of the dataset can be found at the
IDIAP Research Institute website ∗.
4.2.2 MSU Mobile Face Spoofing Database (MSU-MFSD):
The MSU-MFSD dataset [57] was introduced in 2014 by the Michi-
gan State University (MSU). It’s main aim was to tackle the problem
of face spoofing on smartphones where some mobile phone appli-
cations use face for authentication and unlocking the phone. The
dataset includes real and spoofed videos from 35 subjects with a
duration between 9 and 15 seconds. Unlike Replay-Attack dataset
where only a webcam was used for authentication, in MSU-MFSD
two devices were used, the built-in webcam of a MacBook Air 13"
with resolution 640× 480 and the front facing camera of the Google
Nexus 5 smartphone with 720× 480 resolution. So for each sub-
ject there are 2 bona-fide videos, one from each device, and six
attack videos, 3 from each device. Leading to a total of 280 videos,
210 attack and 70 bona-fide videos. The attack scenarios are all
presented to the authentication sensor with a fixed support unlike
Replay-Attack which has videos with fixed and others using hand-
held devices. Three attack scenarios were used (1) print-attack on A3
paper (2) video replay attacks on the screen of an iPad Air and (3)
video replay attacks on Google Nexus 5 smartphone. The dataset is
divided into two subject-disjoint subsets, one for training with 15
subjects, and the other for testing with 20 subjects. The EER on
the test set is used as the evaluation metrics on the MSU-MFSD
database.
4.2.3 Replay-Mobile: In 2016, the IDIAP research institute
that released Replay-Attack, released a new dataset Replay-
Mobile [104]. This was after the widespread of face authentication
on mobile devices and the increase of the need for face-PAD eval-
uation sets to capture the characteristics of mobile devices. The
dataset has 1200 short recordings from 40 subjects captured by two
mobile devices at resolution 720× 1280. Ten bona-fide accesses
were recorded for each subject, in addition to 16 attack videos taken
under different attack modes. Like Replay-Attack, the dataset was
divided into training, development and testing subsets of 12, 16 and
12 subjects respectively, and results are reported as HTER on the test
set.
Five lighting condition were used in recording real-accesses; con-
trolled, adverse, direct, lateral and diffuse). For presentation attack,
high-resolution photos and videos from each client were taken under
two different lighting conditions (lighton, lightoff).
Attack was performed in two ways, (1) photo-print attacks where
the printed high-resolution photo was presented to the capturing
device using either fixed or hand support, (2) matte-screen attack
displaying digital-photo or video with fixed supports.
∗http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
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Table 3 Face databases details.
Dataset Sensor used for
authentication
PA artifact PAI (Presentation
Attack Instrument)
Lighting
conditions
(bona-fide
/ attack)
Subjects
(train / dev
/ test)
Videos per
subject
(bona-fide
+ attack)
Videos per
subset
(bona-fide +
attack)
Replay-Attack
(2012)
(1) W in MacBook laptop
(320× 240)
1) PH ?
2) 720p high-def V ?
?: Canon PowerShot SX150 IS
1) PR (A4)
2) VR on M (iPhone)
3) VR on T (iPad)
2 / 2 50
(15/15/20)
4 + 20 Train: 60+300
Dev : 60+300
Test : 80+400
CASIA-FASD
(2012)
1) Low Q: longtime-used
USB C (680× 480)
2) Normal Q: new USB C
(680× 480)
3) High Q: Sony NEX-5
(1920× 1080)
1) PH ?
2) 720p high-def V ?
?: Sony NEX-5
1) PR (copper A4) -
Warped
2) PR (copper A4) -
Cut
3) VR on T (iPad)
1 / 1 50
(20/-/30)
3 + 9 Train: 60+180
Test : 90+270
MSU-MFSD
(2014)
1) W in MacBook Air
(640× 480)
2) FC of Google Nexus 5
M (720× 480)
1) PH (Canon PowerShot 550D
SLR)
2) 1080p high-def V (Canon
PowerShot 550D SLR)
3) 1080p M V (BC of iPhone S5)
1) PR (A3)
2) high-def VR on T
(iPad)
3) M VR on M (iPhone)
1 / 1 35
(15/-/20)
2 + 6 Train: 30+90
Test : 40+120
Replay-Mobile
(2016)
1) FC of iPad Mini2 T
(720× 1280)
2) FC of LG-G4 M (720×
1280)
1) PH (Nikon coolix P520)
2) 1080p M V (BC of LG-G4 M)
1) PR (A4)
2) VR on matte-screen
(Philips 227ELH
screen)
5 / 2 40
(12/16/12)
10 + 16 Train: 120+192
Dev : 160+256
Test : 110+192
OULU-NPU
(2017)
FC of 6 M (1920× 1080) 1) PH ?
2) high-res M V ?
?: BC of Samsung Galaxy S6
Edge M
1-2) PR (glossy A3) - 2
Printers
3) High-res VR on 19
inch Dell display
4) High-res VR on 13
inch Macbook
3 / 3 55
(20/15/20)
36+72 4 Protocols
Total:
1980+3960
SiW (2018) 1) High Q C: Canon EOS
T6 (1920× 1080)
2) High Q C: Logitech
C920 W (1920× 1080)
1) PH (5, 184 x 3, 456)
2) Use same live videos
1) PR
2) PR of frontal-view
frame from a live V
3-6) VR on 4 screens:
Samsung S8, iPhone7,
iPad Pro, PC
1 / 1 165
(90/-/75)
8 + 20 3 Protocols
Total:
1320+3300
CASIA-SURF
(2018)
1) RealSense SR300
- RGB: (1280× 720)
- Depth/IR: (640× 480)
1) PH 1) PR (A4) 1 / 1
1000
(300/100/600)
1 + 6 Train:
900+5400
Dev: 300+1800
Test:
1800+10800
CASIA-SURF
CeFA (2019)
1) Intel Realsense
- RGB/Depth/IR
- all (1280× 720)
1) PH
2) Same live videos
3) 3D print face mask
4) 3D silica gel face mask
1) PR
2) VR
1 / 2 (2D)
0 / 6
0 / 4
1500
(600/300/600)
99 (0/0/99)
8 (0/0/8)
1 + 3
0 + 18
0 + 8
4 Protocols:
4500+13500
0+5346
0+196
C: Camera, BC: Back-Camera, FC: Front-Camera, W: built-in webcam, T: Tablet, M: Mobile Smartphone, Q: Quality, PH: High-res photo, V: Video, PR: Hard-copy print
of high-res photo, VR: Video replay
4.2.4 Others: Some other datasets for face PAD are also avail-
able but were not used in this paper.
Fig. 1: Sample images from the Replay-Attack datasets (adverse
lighting, hand-support).
* Left to right: top: (bona-fide, print highdef photo, mobile photo), bottom: (highdef
photo, mobile video, highdef video)
* client 007
(a) Laptop
(b) Android
Fig. 2: Sample images from the MSU-MFSD datasets.
* Left to right: bona-fide, printed photo, iphone video, ipad video
* client 001
CASIA-FASD [50]: was released in 2012, having 50 subjects. Three
different imaging qualities were used (Low, Normal and High), and
three types of attacks are generated from the high quality records
of the genuine faces. Namely, cut-photo attack, warped-photo attack
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and video attack on iPad were used. The dataset is split into training
set of 20 subjects, and a testing set including the other 30 subjects.
OULU-NPU [109]: A mobile face PAD dataset was released in
2017 of 55 subjects captured in three different lighting conditions
and background with six different mobile devices. Both print and
video-replay attacks are included using two different PAIs each. Four
protocols were proposed in the paper to evaluate the generalization
of PAD algorithms against different conditions.
Spoof in the Wild (SiW) [89]: Contains 8 real and 20 attack videos
for 165 subjects; more subjects that any previous dataset, and
released in 2018. Bona-fide videos are captured with two high-
quality cameras and collected with different orientations, facial
expressions and lighting conditions. Attack samples are either high-
quality print attacks, or replay videos on 4 different PA devices.
CASIA-SURF [113]: Later in same year; 2018, a large-scale multi-
modal dataset CASIA-SURF was released containing 21000 videos
for 1000 subjects. Each video has three modalities, namely, RGB,
Depth and IR captured by Intel RealSense camera. Only 2D print
attack was performed with 6 different combinations of used photo
state (either full or cut) and 3 different operations like bending the
printed paper or movement with different distance from the camera.
CASIA-SURF CeFA [115]: Although CASIA-SURF dataset [113]
is large-scale, it only includes one ethnicity (Chinese) and one
attack type (2D print). So in 2019, CASIA-SURF cross-ethnicity
Face Anti-spoofing (CeFA) was released to provide a wider range
of ethnicity and attack types, in addition to multiple modalities as
CASIA-SURF. The dataset include videos for 1607 subjects, cov-
ering three ethnicities (Africa, East Asia, and Central Asia), three
modalities, and 4 attack types. Attack types are 2D print attacks,
replay attacks in addition to 3D mask and silica gel attacks.
4.3 Iris spoofing Databases
Many publicly available benchmark datasets were published for the
iris presentation attack problem. Some are captured with commercial
(a) Captured by Tablet
(b) Captured by Mobile
Fig. 3: Sample images from the Replay-Mobile datasets (hand-
support).
* Left to right: bona-fide, print photo, mattescreen photo, mattescreen video)
* client 001
(a) bona-fide
(b) Print attack
Fig. 4: Sample images from the Iris datasets. Left to right: ATVS-
FIr, Warsaw 2013, MobBioFake.
ATVS-Fir id: u0001s0001_ir_r_0002
Warsaw id: 0039_R_1
MobBioFake id: 007_R2
iris recognition sensors operating with near-infrared illumination
like BioSec-ATVS-FIr [12] or LivDet datasets [52, 110, 117], while
more recent datasets were introduced, captured in the visible light
illumination using smartphones, e.g MobBioFake [54, 105]. Below
are details of the databases used in this paper.
4.3.1 Biosec ATVS-FIr: The ATVS-FIr dataset was introduced
in 2012 [12] from the Biosec dataset [119]. It contains 800 bona-
fide and 800 attack photos of 50 different subjects. The attack is
performed by enhancing quality of the bona-fide iris photo, print-
ing it on high-quality paper using HP printers, then presenting it
to the same LG Iris Access EOU3000 sensor used to capture the
bona-fide irises. All images have 640× 480 resolution and are
grayscale. For each user 16 different bona-fide photos were cap-
tured from which 16 attack photos were generated. Four photos
were taken from each of the two eyes in two sessions, so for each
user total = 4 images× 2 eyes× 2 sessions = 16 bona-fide and
same for fake attacks. Each eye of the 50 subjects was considered a
subject on its own, then the total of 100 subjects were divided into a
training set of 25 subjects (200 bona-fide + 200 attack) and a test set
of 75 subjects (600 bona-fide + 600 attack)
4.3.2 LivDet Warsaw 2013: Warsaw University of Technology
published the first LivDet Warsaw Iris dataset in 2013 [52] as part of
the first international iris liveness competition in 2013 [116]. Two
more versions of this dataset were later published in 2015 [117] and
2017 [110]. The LivDet-Iris-2013-Warsaw contains 852 bona-fide
and 815 attack printout images from 237 subjects. For attack images,
the real iris was printed using two different printers, then captured by
the same IrisGuard AD100 sensor as the bona-fide photos.
4.3.3 MobBioFake: The first competition for iris PAD in
mobile scenarios was the Mobi-live competition in 2014 [118]. The
MobBioFake iris spoofing dataset [54] was generated from the iris
images of the MobBIO Multimodal Database [105]. It comprises
800 bona-fide and 800 attack images captured by the back camera
(8MP resolution) of an Android mobile smartphone (Asus Trans-
former Pad TF 300T) in the visible light not in near-infrared like
previous iris datasets. The images are color RGB and have a resolu-
tion of 250× 200. The MobBioFake database has 100 subjects, each
has 8 bona-fide + 8 attack images captured under different illumina-
tion and occlusion settings. The attack samples were generated from
printed images of the original ones under similar conditions with the
same device. The images are split evenly between training and test
subsets.
5 Proposed PAD Approach / Methodology /
Algorithm
Although several previous studies use CNN for presentation
attack detection, they either used custom designed networks, e.g.
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Fig. 5: Overview of the PAD algorithm
Spoofnet [95, 98], or used pre-trained CNN to extract features that
are later classified with conventional classification algorithms such
as SVM. In this paper, we propose to train deeper CNNs for the
direct classification of bona-fide and presentation attack images. We
choose to assess the state-of-the-art modern deep convolutional neu-
ral networks that achieved high accuracies in the task of image
classification on ImageNet [108]. This PAD approach is a pas-
sive software texture-based method that does not require additional
hardware nor cooperation from the user.
In addition, we compare two different fine-tuning approaches
starting from network weights trained on ImageNet classification
dataset. A decision can be made to either retrain the whole network
weights given the new datasets of the problem, or choose to freeze
the weights of most of the network layers and finetune only a set of
selected last layers from the network including the final classification
layer.
Figure 5 shows the building blocks of the full pipeline proposed to
classify face videos or iris images as bona-fide attempts or spoofed
attacks. First, the face or iris image is preprocessed and resized,
then input to the CNN to a series of convolutional, pooling, and
dropout layers. Finally, the last fully connected layer of each network
is altered to output a binary bona-fide/attack classification using
sigmoid activation instead of the 1000 classes of ImageNet.
5.1 Preprocessing
5.1.1 Face videos: Each of the face benchmark datasets used
in this paper have face coordinates for each frame of each video pro-
vided. These coordinates are used to crop a square to be used as input
to the network. The square is cropped such that the region of interest
(ROI) includes the face and some background in order to account
for some contextual information. The side of this square is chosen
empirically to be equal twice the minimum of the width and height
of the face groundtruth box. The cropped bounding box containing
the face is then resized to each network’s default size, to be used as
input to the first convolutional layer of the CNN.
5.1.2 Iris images: When using iris images for recognition or
presentation attack detection, most studies in the literature first
extract and segment the iris region. However, in this paper we
directly use the full iris image captured by the NIR sensor or smart-
phone camera, in order to make the approach as simple as possible.
This helps the the network to learn the best regions, from the full
periocular area, that affect the classification problem. The presence
of some contextual information like paper borders can also be useful
for the attack detection.
Table 4 Performance of selected Deep CNN architectures on ImageNet in
terms of Single-model Error % reported in each model’s paper
top-1
(single-crop /
multi-crop )
top-5
(single-crop /
multi-crop )
# parameters # layers
InceptionV3 [120] 21.2 / 19.47
(12-crop)
5.6 / 4.48
(12-crop)
23.9M 159
MobileNetV2
(alpha=1.4) [122]
25.3 / - 7.58? / - 6.2M 88
MobileNetV2
(default
alpha=1.0) [122]
28 / - 9.8? / - 3.5M 88
VGG16 [123] - / 24.4 9.95? / 7.1 138.4M 23
? Not available in paper, reported by Keras https://keras.io/
5.2 Generalization / Data augmentation
It is known that deep networks have a lot of parameters to train which
can cause it to overfit if the training set is not big enough. Data
augmentations is a very helpful technique that is used to artificially
increase the size of the available training set and to simulate real-
life distortions and variations that may not be present in the original
set. So during training, for each mini-batch pulled from the train-
ing set, images in this batch are randomly cropped, rotated slightly
with a random angle, scaled or translated in the x or y axis, so the
exact same image is not seen twice by the network. This leads to an
artificially simulated larger training dataset and a more generalized
network that is robust to changes in pose and illumination.
5.3 Modern deep CNN architectures
Based on official results published for recent CNN networks on the
ImageNet dataset [108], three of the networks that achieved less than
10% top-5 accuracies are InceptionV3 [120], ResNet50 [121], and
MobileNetV2 [122]. Table 4 states the single-model top-1 and top-5
error for each of these network on the ImageNet validation dataset,
its depth and number of parameters, ordered by ascending top-5 error
values. One thing that can be noticed about the higher accuracy net-
works is the increased number of layers, these networks are much
deeper than for example the well-known VGG [123].
For the purpose of this paper, we chose networks that have less
than 30 million parameters to finetune. And for the sake of diver-
sity, we selected two networks, one with relatively high-number
of parameters; InceptionV3 [120] ( 24 M parameters with 5.6%
top-5 accuracy), then a more recent and less deep network with
far less number of parameters MobilenetV2 [122] ( 4 M param-
eters with 9.9% top-5 accuracy) which makes it very suitable for
mobile applications. Even though all three networks have signifi-
cantly less parameters than VGG, they are much deeper and have
higher accuracy.
In each architecture, its final prediction softmax layer is removed
and the output of the preceding global average pooling layer is fed
into a dropout layer (dropout rate of 0.5) then a sigmoid activation
layer for final binary prediction.
5.4 Fine-tuning approaches
As stated previously, the available datasets are small sized and the
used networks have millions of parameters to learn. This will prob-
ably lead the model parameters to overfit these small sets if the
network weights were trained from scratch; i.e. starting from random
weights. The training model will get stuck into a local minima, lead-
ing to a poor generalization ability. A better approach is initializing
the weights of the network with weights pre-trained on ImageNet,
then we have three training options, (1) use transfer learning: feed
the images to the network to extract features from the last layer
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Table 5 Number of all parameters in each model and the number of parameters to learn if finetuning only the final block is done.
Model Total # of parameters Last block To train First trainable layer # parameters to learn
InceptionV3 21,804,833 Block after mixed9 (train mixed9_1 until mixed10) conv2d_90 6,075,585
MobileNetV2 2,259,265 last "_inverted_res_block" block_16_expand 887,361
before prediction, then use these features instead of raw image pix-
els for classification using an SVM or NN, (2) finetune weights of
only several last layers of the network while fixing the weights of
previous layers to their ImageNet-trained values, or (3) finetune the
whole network weights using the new input dataset.
We experiment with only fine-tuning, either the whole network or
a few top layers, which we choose to be the last convolutional block.
For the approach of fine-tuning the last convolutional block, we state
in Table 5, for each architecture, the name of the last block’s first
layer, and the number of parameters in this block to be finetuned.
5.5 Single model with multiple biometrics
In addition to training/testing with datasets that belong to same bio-
metric source, i.e face only or iris only, we experiment with training
a single generic presentation attack detection network to detect pre-
sentation attack whether the presented biometric is a face or an iris.
We train with different combinations of face+iris sets then cross eval-
uate the trained models on the other face and iris datasets, to see if
this approach is comparable to training on only face images or iris
images.
6 Experiments and Results
In this section, we describe images and videos preprocessing method
used, explain the followed training strategy and experimental setup.
6.1 Preprocessing
6.1.1 Preparing images: For iris images, only the MobBio-
Fake database consists of color images captured using a smartphone.
The other datasets, ATVS-FIr and Warsaw, were obtained with near-
infrared sensors producing grayscale images. Since all networks
used in this paper were pretrained on colored images of ImageNet,
their input layer only accepts color images with three channels and
so for grayscale iris images, the single gray channel is replicated
two times to form a 3-channel image passed as the network input.
The whole iris image is used without cropping nor iris detection and
segmentation.
On the other hand, all face PAD datasets consist of color videos.
Duration of videos range from 9 to 15 seconds, videos of Replay-
Attack database have 25 frames per second (fps), while those of
MSU-MFSD have 30 fps. Not all video frames are used, to avoid
redundancy and over-fitting to the subjects, so we use frame skip-
ping to sample one frame every 20 frames. This frame dropping
leads to sampling around 10 to 19 frames per video based on its
length. For each sampled frame, instead of using the whole frame as
the network input, it is first cropped to either include only the face
region or a box that has approximately twice the face area to include
some background context. Annotated face bounding boxes have a
side length ranging from 70px to 100px in Replay-Attack videos,
and from 170px to 250px for MSU-MFSD.
Table 6 shows the training, validation and testing sizes (in number
of images) for each of the datasets used in the experiments (after
frame dropping in videos). Emphasized in bold is the total number
of images available for training the CNN for each database.
The images are then resized according to the default input
size values for each of the used networks. That is 224× 224 for
MobilenetV2, and 299× 299 for InceptionV3. The RGB values of
input images to the InceptionV3 and the MobilenetV2 networks are
first scaled to have a value between -1 and 1.
Table 6 Number of images used in training and testing. For face datasets,
number of videos is shown followed by number of frames between (). For iris
datasets, only number of dataset images is mentioned.
Database Subset Number of videos (frames
?)
Attack + bona-fide
Replay-Attack
train 300(3414) + 60(1139) = 4553
devel 300(3411) + 60(1140)
test 400(4516) + 80(1507)
MSU-MFSD train 90(1257) + 30(419) = 1676test 120(1655) + 84(551)
Replay-Mobile
train 192(2851) + 120(1762) = 4613
devel 256(3804) + 160(2356)
test 192(2842) + 110(1615)
ATVS-FIr train 200 + 200 = 400test 600 + 600
Warsaw 2013 train 203 + 228 = 431test 612 + 624
MobBioFake train 400 + 400 = 800test 400 + 400
? (frames: skipping every 20 frames)
6.1.2 Data augmentation: As shown in Table 6, the total num-
ber of images available from each dataset to train the CNN is
relatively much smaller than sizes of datasets usually used for deep
networks training. This could cause the network to memorize these
small set of samples instead of learning useful features and so fail
to generalize. So in order to reduce overfitting, data augmentation
is used during training. Images are randomly transformed before
feeding to the network with one or more of the following transforma-
tions: Horizontal flip, Rotation between 0 and 10 degrees, Horizontal
translation by 0 to 20 percent of image width, Vertical translation by
0 to 20 percent of image height, or Zooming by 0 to 20 percent
6.2 Training strategy and Hyperparameters
For training the CNN networks, we used Adam optimizer [124]
with beta1 = 0.9, beta2 = 0.999, and learning rate 1× 10−4.We
trained the network for max of 50 epochs but added a stopping
criteria if the training or validation accuracy reached 99.95% or
validation accuracy did not improve (with delta = 0.0005) for 40
epochs.
Intermediate models with high validation accuracy were saved
and finally the model with the least validation error was chosen
for inference. Because of the randomness introduced by the data
augmentation and the dropout, several training sessions may pro-
duce slightly different results, specially in cross-validation, for this
reason, three runs were performed for each configuration (model +
dataset + fine-tuning approach) and the min error is reported.
6.3 Evaluation
6.3.1 Videos scoring: The CNN accepts images as input, so
we treated each frame in the face video as a separate image. Then at
reporting the final score for each video we perform score-level fusion
by averaging scores of the samples from the same video. Accuracy
and errors can then be calculated based on these video-level scores
not frame-level scores as some reported results in literature.
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Table 7 Intra and cross-dataset results. Test HTER reported with Replay-Attack and Replay-Mobile testing, otherwise Test EER.
Train Database Test Database Finetune Approach (A) Finetune Approach (B)InceptionV3 MobilenetV2 InceptionV3 MobilenetV2
Replay-Attack
Replay-Attack 6.9% 1.6% 0% 0.63%
MSU-MFSD 33% 30% 17.5% 22.5%
Replay-Mobile 35.8% 43.4% 64.7% 56.7%
MSU-MFSD
Replay-Attack 34.7% 22.9% 23.8% 13.7%
MSU-MFSD 7.5% 2.05% 0% 2.08%
Replay-Mobile 32.6% 26.8% 24.6% 23.7%
Replay-Mobile
Replay-Attack 33.2% 45.1% 31.1% 45.5%
MSU-MFSD 35.4% 30% 32.9% 37.5%
Replay-Mobile 3.6% 3.2% 0% 0%
ATVS-FIr ATVS-FIr 0% 0% 0% 0%Warsaw 2013 1.9% 5.4% 0.16% 1.6%
MobBioFake (Grayscale) 44% 39% 36.5% 39%
Warsaw 2013 ATVS-FIr 0% 1% 0.17% 0.5%Warsaw 2013 0% 0.32% 0% 0%
MobBioFake (Grayscale) 43% 39% 32.8% 47%
MobBioFake
ATVS-FIr 10% 30% 18.7% 20.2%
Warsaw 2013 15.7% 32% 23.4% 18.8%
MobBioFake 8.75% 7% 0.5% 0.75%
MobBioFake (Grayscale)
ATVS-FIr 2.5% 23.7% 12% 16.2%
Warsaw 2013 6.2% 17.3% 10.1% 17.2%
MobBioFake (Grayscale) 10.5% 7.3% 0.25% 1.25%
6.3.2 Evaluation metrics: The equal-error-rate (EER) is used
to report the error of the test set. EER is defined as the rate at
which both the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the False Accep-
tance Rate (FAR) are equal. FRR is the probability of the algorithm
rejecting bona-fide samples as attack ones, which is equal to
FR/total bona fide attempts, while FAR is the probability by
which the algorithm might accept attack samples and consider them
bona-fide, FA/total attack attempts.
For datasets that have a separate development subset; e.g. Replay-
Attack, first a score threshold is calculated that achieves EER on
the devel set. Then this threshold is used to calculate error in the
test set known as half-total error rate (HTER) which is equal to
the summation of the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the False
Acceptance Rate (FAR) at a threshold, divided by two, HTER =
(FRR+ FAR)/2.
An ISO/IEC international standard for PAD testing was described
in ISO/IEC 30107-3:2017 ∗ where PAD subsystems are to be eval-
uated using two metrics; attack presentation classification error
rate (APCER) and bona-fide presentation classification error rate
(BPCER). However, we report results in this paper using HTER and
EER to be able to compare with state-of-the-art published results,
EER can also be understood as the rate at which APCER is equal to
BPCER.
6.3.3 Cross-dataset evaluation: In order to test the gener-
alization ability of the used networks, we perform cross-dataset
evaluation where we train on a dataset and test on another dataset.
For the iris datasets, we know of no previous work to have performed
EER cross-dataset evaluation on iris PAD databases before.
6.4 Experimental setup
For implementation we used Keras † with tensorflow ‡ backend for
the deep CNN models, and for datasets management and experi-
ments pipelines we used Bob package [125, 126]. Experiments were
performed on NVIDIA GeForce 840m GPU with CUDA version 9.0.
∗https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:
30107:-3:ed-1:v1:en
†https://github.com/keras-team/keras
‡https://www.tensorflow.org/
6.5 Experiment 1 Results
In the first experiment, we compare the two different finetuning
approaches explained in Section 5.4. For this experiment, training
and testing was done using face only or iris only datasets. We per-
formed intra and cross-dataset testing to evaluate the effectiveness
and generalization of the proposed approach, and used benchmark
datasets to be able to compare against state-of-the-art. For each fine-
tuning approach, we performed three runs and reported the minimum
error obtained. In Table 7 we refer to the first finetuning approach
as (A) where the weights of only the last block is finetuned, while
approach (B) is when all the layers’ weights are finetuned using the
given dataset.
It can be noticed from Table 7 that finetuning all the network
weights achieved better results than fixing weights of first layers to
their ImageNet-trained values and only finetuning just the final few
layers. For intra-datasets error, we achieved State-of-the-art (SOTA)
0% test error for all datasets using InceptionV3, while MobilenetV2
achieved 0% for most datasets and 1-2% on MSU-MFSD and Mob-
BioFake. The table also shows that cross-dataset errors on the iris
datasets ATVS-FIr and Warsaw are much lower when grayscale ver-
sion of the MobBioFake iris dataset was used for training instead of
using the original color images of the dataset, without much affecting
the intra-dataset error on MobBioFake itself.
6.6 Experiment 2 Results
For the second experiment, we only use finetuning approach (B);
adjusting the weights of all the network’s layers using the training
images. Here we use both face and iris images as train images input
to a single model for classifying bona-fide from attack presentation
in general regardless the biometric type.
Results in Table 8 show that using both face and iris images in
training a single model to differentiate between bona-fide and pre-
sentation attack images achieved very good results on both face
and iris test sets. For some cases in face datasets, this combination
boosted the performance for cross-dataset testing where for exam-
ple on Replay-Attack test dataset 11.9% HTER was achieved when
training a MobilenetV2 using MSU-MFSD and Warsaw Iris dataset,
vs 13.7% HTER when only MSU-MFSD was used for training as
reported in Table 7.
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Table 8 Training with Face+Iris images. Intra and cross-dataset results. Test HTER reported with Replay-Attack and Replay-Mobile testing, otherwise Test EER.
Train Iris Database: ATVS-FIr Warsaw 2013 MobBioFake (RGB) MobBioFake (Grayscale)
Train Face
Database
Test Database InceptionV3 MobilenetV2 InceptionV3 MobilenetV2 InceptionV3 MobilenetV2 InceptionV3 MobilenetV2
Replay-Attack
– Number of training
epochs
2 6 3 6 4 9 2 8
Replay-attack 0% 0.63% 0% 0% 0.25% 1.5% 0% 1.4%
MSU-MFSD 29.6% 20.4% 15% 20% 19.6% 25% 30% 17.5%
Replay-Mobile 58.1% 48.7% 57.3% 35.4% 60.6% 58.1% 39% 40%
ATVS-FIr 0% 0% 10.5% 2.7% 5.17% 8.8% 3.5% 12.3%
Warsaw 2013 0.16% 0.16% 0% 0% 4.13% 1.62% 15.2% 5.7%
MobBioFake (RGB) 58.5% 71.3% 56% 45.5% 0.75% 0.25% 1.75% 2%
MobBioFake (Grayscale) 50% 69% 56.3% 38.5% 1.5% 0.75% 1.25% 1%
MSU-MFSD
– Number of training
epochs
4 6 3 5 10 9 7 9
Replay-Attack 22.8% 14.5% 25.3% 11.9% 22.8% 27.7% 16.6% 21.6%
MSU-MFSD 0% 2.08% 0.4% 2.08% 2.5% 2.08% 0.4% 2.5%
Replay-Mobile 28.7% 26.1% 19.2% 24.8% 22.7% 26.8% 25.2% 17%
ATVS-FIr 0% 0% 0.33% 2.3% 11.8% 12.5% 0.8% 12.33%
Warsaw 2013 0.6% 0.8% 0% 0% 43.9% 6.55% 7.4% 9.1%
MobBioFake (RGB) 52.5% 39.2% 45.5% 42% 2% 1.25% 2.5% 2.5%
MobBioFake (Grayscale) 45.3% 38.5% 34.5% 43% 22% 4.25% 1.75% 2%
Replay-Mobile
– Number of training
epochs
2 3 1 3 4 7 5 4
Replay-Attack 24.2% 42.6% 31% 35.7% 41.6% 64.3% 33.7% 54.6%
MSU-MFSD 32.5% 30.4% 32.5% 42.5% 60% 52.5% 40% 44.6%
Replay-Mobile 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.26% 0% 0.46%
ATVS-FIr 0% 0% 0.83% 6% 15.5% 22.5% 6.5% 28.2%
Warsaw 2013 2.1% 4% 0% 0% 9.6% 28.9% 22.1% 26.1%
MobBioFake (RGB) 46.5% 53% 49.3% 54.3% 1% 0.75% 8.8% 3.25%
MobBioFake (Grayscale) 33.5% 43.3% 41.7% 45.8% 5.3% 6.5% 2% 1.75%
(bold-underlined): best cross-dataset error for each test dataset, (bold): best cross-dataset error for each test dataset in each row (i.e: given a certain face train set)
Table 9 Best cross-dataset results and comparison with SOTA. Test HTER reported with Replay-Attack testing, otherwise Test EER. Underlined is the best cross-
dataset error for the test dataset.
Train Database Test Database SOTA / corresponding intra-dataset error Our Best / corresponding intra-dataset error
Model trained with only 1 biometric Model trained with face + iris
Replay-Attack MSU-MFSD 28.5% / 8.25% 17.5% / 0% 15% / 0%GuidedScale-LBP [127] "LGBP" "InceptionV3 (B)" "InceptionV3" (Warsaw 2013)
Replay-Mobile 49.2% / 3.13% 35.8% / 6.9% 35.4% / 0%GuidedScale-LBP [127] "LBP+ GS-LBP" "InceptionV3 (A)" "MobilenetV2" (Warsaw 2013)
MSU-MFSD
Replay-Attack 21.40% / 1.5% 13.7% / 2.08% 11.9% / 2.08%Color-texture [66] "MobilenetV2 (B)" "MobilenetV2" (Warsaw 2013)
Replay-Mobile 32.1% / 8.5% 23.7% / 2.08% 17% / 2.5%GuidedScale-LBP [127] "LBP+ GS-LBP" "MobilenetV2 (B)" "MobilenetV2" (MobBioFake (Gray))
Replay-Mobile
Replay-Attack 46.19% / 0.52% 31.1% / 0% 24.2% / 0%GuidedScale-LBP [127] "LGBP" "InceptionV3 (B)" "InceptionV3" (ATVS-FIr)
MSU-MFSD 33.56% / 0.98% 30% / 3.2% 30.4% / 0%GuidedScale-LBP [127] "LBP+ GS-LBP" "MobilenetV2 (A)" "MobilenetV2" (ATVS-FIr)
ATVS-FIr
Warsaw 2013 None available 0.16% / 0% 0.16% / 0%"InceptionV3 (B)" "Any" (Replay-Attack)
MobBioFake (Gray) None available 36.5% / 0% 33.5% / 0%"InceptionV3 (B)" "InceptionV3" (Replay-Mobile)
Warsaw 2013
ATVS-FIr None available 0% / 0% 0.33% / 0%"InceptionV3 (A)" "InceptionV3" (MSU-MFSD)
MobBioFake (Gray) None available 32.8% / 0% 34.5% / 0%"InceptionV3 (B)" "InceptionV3" (MSU-MFSD)
MobBioFake (Gray)
ATVS-FIr None available 2.5% / 10.5% 0.8% / 1.75%"InceptionV3 (A)" "InceptionV3" (MSU-MFSD)
Warsaw 2013 None available 6.2% / 10.5% 5.7% / 1%"InceptionV3 (A)" "MobilenetV2" (Replay-Attack)
Table 8 also confirms findings from Table 7; that training with
grayscale version of the MobBioFake iris dataset gives better cross-
dataset error on the other gray iris datasets, without much affecting
the intra-dataset error on the MobBioFake dataset itself. Not only
this, but it also achieves lower cross-dataset error rates when eval-
uating on face datasets, by helping the network to focus on color
features when only testing is performed on a face image, since all
training face images were colored but all iris training images were
grayscale.
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Fig. 6: High frequency components Attack iris images from Warsaw
dataset.
* Left-to-right: Input image, Frequency compoents (Fourier), High-pass-filter, Inverse
fourier on image, High frequency components overlayed over image
(a) Bona-fide Iris samples
(b) Attack Iris samples
Fig. 7: High frequency components in bona-fide vs Attack iris
images from Warsaw datase.
* Left-to-right: Input image, High frequency components overlayed over image, Net-
work activation response of realF, Network activation response of attackF
* Top: 0050_R_2, Bottom: 0088_R_3
6.7 Comparison with state of the art
In Table 9 we compare our best achieved cross-datasets evalua-
tion error with the state-of-the-art (SOTA). This table shows that
our cross-dataset testing results surpass SOTA on face datasets.
For models trained on single biometric, InceptionV3 achieved best
cross-dataset error on most datasets, except when training with
MSU-MFSD, where MobilenetV2 achieved best test HTER on
Replay-Attack and Replay-Mobile. While both models interchange-
ably achieved better error rate when network was trained using both
face and iris images.
6.8 Analysis and discussion
Given results in Table 8, we feel that it is important to analyze
features learnt by the networks that were trained on two biometrics.
6.8.1 Filters Activation and frequency components: By
training the network on several biometrics, we believe that the net-
work is forced to learn to recognize specific patterns and texture
in case of real presentations in general, which are not present in
attack samples and vice-versa. An approach to prove that, is to visu-
alize the response of certain feature maps from the network, given
sample input images. For this task, we chose a MobilenetV2 net-
work, trained with Iris-Warsaw and Face Replay-Attack datasets,
from which we selected to visualize response of some filters from
the final convolutional block before classification.
(a) Bona-fide Face samples
(b) Attack Face samples
Fig. 8: High frequency components in bona-fide vs Attack face
images from Replay-Attack dataset.
* Left-to-right: Input image, High frequency components overlayed over image, Net-
work activation response of realF, Network activation response of attackF
* Top: client002, Bottom: client103
(a) Correctly classified bona-fide images
(b) Incorrectly classified bona-fide images
Fig. 9: Sample classified bona-fide images.
* Left-to-right: Replay-Attack, MSU-MFSD - Replay-Mobile, ATVS-FIR , Warsaw,
MobbioFake
(a) Correctly classified Attack images
(b) Incorrectly classified Attack images
Fig. 10: Sample classified Attack images.
* Left-to-right: Replay-Attack, MSU-MFSD - Replay-Mobile, ATVS-FIR , Warsaw,
MobbioFake
In addition to visualizing network activation response, we were
also interested in viewing the distribution of high frequency com-
ponents on the input images. We applied high pass filter to remove
most of the low frequencies and keep only the high frequency com-
ponents of an image, then we overlay these high frequency regions
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on the input image for better understanding of where high frequency
is concentrated in bona-fide images vs attack images.
The steps for obtaining the regions with high frequency in image
are depicted in Figure 6. Fourier transform was first applied to get
frequency components in the image, High-pass-filter is then used
to remove most of the low frequencies. After that, inverse Fourier is
used to obtain an image with only the high frequency regions visible,
and finally these regions are overlayed on original image to highlight
those regions on the input image.
Regarding the chosen filters to visualize, the final layer before
classification is consisted of 1280 filter, when an input image is of
size 224× 224, the feature maps resulting from these final 1280 fil-
ters have size 7× 7. From these 1280 filters, we selected two filters
for each biometric. One that had highest average activation response
by real images, we call it realF, and the other filter that was highly
activated by attack images, called attackF. We then visualize the
7× 7 activation response of these filters for some bona-fide and
attack samples belonging to the same subject.
Figure 7 shows samples from the iris Warsaw dataset with their
high frequency regions highlighted in addition to activation response
of realF and attackF features. The visualization clearly shows that
for real iris samples, high frequency areas are concentrated at the
bright regions around the inner eye corner and the lash-line, how-
ever, for attack presentations, high frequency regions mostly focus
on noise patterns scattered on the attack medium (paper). The trained
network could successfully recognize the real features highly rep-
resented at the eye corner, by realF giving high response at those
regions in real image, while failing to detect them in attack sam-
ples. AttackF also manages to detect paper noise patterns in attack
samples. which are missing in the real images.
Similar visualization for face images of Replay-Attack dataset
is shown in Figure 8. The attack presentation in these samples is
achieved using handheld mobile device showing a photo of the sub-
ject. We can notice the absence of high frequency response around
the face edges, mouth and eyes, which are present in real samples
and detected by the network through realF feature. On the other
hand, these attack images contain certain noise patterns on the clear
background area which are detected successfully by the attackF of
the network.
By visualizing the high frequency regions in the images, it was
proven that high frequency variations in case of real images, focus
on certain edges and changes in the 3d real biometric presented.
While in case of attack presentations, high frequency components
represented noise, either spread on paper in case of paper attack
medium, or noise patterns resulting from the display monitor of
a mobile attack device. Our trained CNN network managed to
correctly localize such features and lead to successful classification.
6.8.2 Gradient-weighted class activation maps: Another
approach to analyze what the network learned, is by using gradient-
weighted class activation maps [10]; grad-cam, which highlights the
areas that contributed most to the network’s classification decision
for an input image.
We chose the trained MobilenetV2 network, on Replay-Attack
face dataset and MobbioFake gray iris dataset, to analyze the acti-
vation maps for some bona-fide and attack test images from the 6
datasets. Figure 9 shows the grad-cam for the bona-fide class given
some real test samples that were either correctly of incorrectly clas-
sified, and Figure 10 shows the same but for presentation attack
images.
The visualizations in these figures show clearly that the network
focuses on features of the face and iris centers to make its decision
for a bona-fide presentation, and in cases when these center areas
have lower activations, the network decides the image is an attack.
And although the network was trained on two different biometrics, it
could perfectly focus on the important center parts for each biometric
individually.
7 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we surveyed the different face and iris presentation
attack detection methods proposed in literature with focus on the use
of very deep modern CNN architectures to tackle the PAD problem
in both face and iris recognition.
We compared two different networks; InceptionV3 and MobileNetV2,
with two finetuning approaches starting from network weights that
were trained on ImageNet dataset. Experimental results show that
InceptionV3 achieved 0% SOTA intra-dataset error on 6 publicly
available benchmark datasets when finetuning the whole network’s
weights. The problem of small datasets sizes with very deep net-
works was overcome by augmenting the original data with random
flipping, slight rotation and translation. In addition to starting the
network training with non-random weights already pretrained on
ImageNet dataset. This was to avoid the weights overfitting the small
training dataset, however, for future work, we would like to check
the effect of training these deep networks from scratch using the
available PAD datasets.
The generalization ability of these networks has been tested by
performing cross-dataset evaluation and better-than-SOTA results
were reported for the face datasets. As far as we know this is the
first paper to include cross-dataset Equal-Error-Rate evaluation for
the three iris PAD datasets used, for which we achieved close to 0%
test EER.
Not only cross-dataset evaluation was performed, but we also
trained a single network using multiple biometric data; face and
iris images. This commonly trained network achieved less cross-
dataset error rates than networks trained with a single biometric type.
This approach can be later applied on other biometric traits; such
as the ear, to further demonstrate the effectiveness of using several
biometric traits for training the PAD algorithm.
Finally, we provided analysis of the features learned by the net-
works, and showed their correlation with the frequency components
present in input images regardless the biometric type. We also visu-
alized the class heatmaps generated by the network for the bona-fide
class which showed that the center of the face or iris are the most
important parts that cause a network to select a bona-fide classifica-
tion decision. For future work, we would like to apply patch-based
CNN and identify the regions that contribute most to the attack
detection in hope for improving the generalization of the approach
by using a region-based CNN method.
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